دانلود مقاله ترجمه شده نقش موسسات بین المللی در پرداختن به بحران های مالی قرن بیست و یکم : مقابله یا همکاری ؟

The role of international financial institutions is to promote cooperation. They have limited scope to confront their members because their authority derives from those same members, which have ceded a small measure of sovereignty to them. The question I address is whether nations have ceded too much sovereignty to international financial institutions. My answer is negative. Whether the international financial institution is formal, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), informal, like the Financial Stability Board (FSB), or institutionalized, like the euro area, an excessive attachment to national sovereignty is holding back cooperation

There are alternative views. Two months ago Mark Mazower wrote a piece in the Financial Times suggesting that Europe raised the specter of an ungovernable world. He noted that the concept of “international” was coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1789.1 In Mazower’s words, the prevailing view in the post-Napoleonic era was that nationalism and internationalism were “soul mates.” He argued that this philosophy underpinned the creation of the European Union, starting with the Schuman Declaration in 1950 which proposed the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. The idea was that “international cooperation is the best guarantee of national wellbeing.” The same might be said about international cooperation in the economic and financial arena, in general, and about participation in international organizations designed to promote such cooperation, in particular

Mazower’s thesis was that this philosophical approach may have produced net benefits during the first four decades after World War II, but starting in the mid-1980s, the notion that sovereignty and international cooperation are complementary was called into question. The economic gains were reversed by the association of cooperation with the liberalization of capital movements. He identifies the architects of that view as Paul A. Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and Michel Camdessus, former managing director of the International Monetary Fund. I am confident that Paul Volcker would be surprised by that identification. In the case of Camdessus, in the late 1990s, he advocated updating the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to provide the Fund with an updated and clearer jurisdiction over capital movements, but I can assure you that he is not an advocate of unrestrained capital movements for all countries at all times