دانلود Accounting conservatism and managerial risk-taking: Corporate acquisitions
عنوان انگليسي
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Accounting conservatism and managerial risk-taking: Corporate acquisitions
چکیده
Abstract
Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that accounting conservatism decreases managerial incentives to make negative net present value investments. I develop and test a new hypothesis that accounting conservatism is associated with managers making less risky investments. I find that under more conservative accounting managers make less risky acquisitions and that firms with accounting-based debt covenants drive this association. This result is consistent with conservative firms avoiding risky investments because of the potential for large losses to trigger debt covenants. Conservatism reducing risk-shifting can in part explain debt holders' demand for conservative accounting.
Keywords:
Mergers and acquisitions Accounting conservatism Risk-taking Investment
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